Resilient Information Aggregation

DOI10.4204/EPTCS.379.6MaRDI QIDQ6199595zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date 28 February 2024

Published in Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05054

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Abstract: In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the mediator, who recommends an action to the receiver based on the messages received. The payoff of the senders and of the receiver depend on both the state of the world and the action selected by the receiver. This setting extends the celebrated cheap talk model in two aspects: there are many senders (as opposed to just one) and there is a mediator. From a practical perspective, this setting captures platforms in which strategic experts advice is aggregated in service of action recommendations to the user. We aim at finding an optimal mediator/platform that maximizes the users' welfare given highly resilient incentive compatibility requirements on the equilibrium selected: we want the platform to be incentive compatible for the receiver/user when selecting the recommended action, and we want it to be resilient against group deviations by the senders/experts. We provide highly positive answers to this challenge, manifested through efficient algorithms.

Recommendations

• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• The value of mediated communication
• Privacy and truthful equilibrium selection for aggregative games
• Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game
• Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Beyond nash equilibrium
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Competition in persuasion
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strong mediated equilibrium
• The platform design problem
• The value of mediated communication

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