Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps

DOI10.1007/S003550050064MaRDI QIDQ1367923zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Heine Rasmussen

Publication date 13 April 1998

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050064

zbMATH Keywords

continuous aggregation mapsgame formstrategy-prooftopological conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(4)

• Topological social choice
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• Existence of approximate social welfare

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