The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem revisited

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.09.007zbMath1304.91077OpenAlexW2056588049MaRDI QIDQ478105

Alexander Reffgen, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date: 3 December 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

votinginductionstrategy-proofnessGibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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