Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.07.002zbMath1368.91025OpenAlexW2227939299MaRDI QIDQ504397

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Massimo Marinacci, Fabio Maccheroni

Publication date: 16 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:459

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionconjectural equilibriuminformation feedbackpartially specified probabilitiesselfconfirming equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games ⋮ New results on the existence of open loop Nash equilibria in discrete time dynamic games via generalized Nash games ⋮ Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources ⋮ Ellsberg games ⋮ Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium ⋮ Risk attitudes in axiomatic decision theory: a conceptual perspective ⋮ OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES ⋮ Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty ⋮ Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium ⋮ General Luce model

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information
• On general minimax theorems
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Subjective games and equilibria
• The work of John Nash in game theory. Nobel seminar, December 8, 1994
• Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
• Structural consistency and strategic independence in extensive games
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium