Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
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Publication:617590
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.007zbMath1232.91281OpenAlexW1966210300MaRDI QIDQ617590
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.007
Related Items (3)
Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO ⋮ Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
Cites Work
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- On countervailing incentives
- Optimal Auction Design
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Some Minimax Theorems.
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