Infection and immunization: a new class of evolutionary game dynamics

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.06.004zbMath1205.91032OpenAlexW2021925584MaRDI QIDQ625047

Immanuel M. Bomze, Samuel Rota Bulò

Publication date: 11 February 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityreplicator dynamicsequilibrium selectionfictitious playrevision protocolbest responselearning population games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (13)

Graph Transduction as a Noncooperative Game ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata ⋮ A class of evolutionary models for participation games with negative feedback ⋮ The continuous time infection-immunization dynamics ⋮ Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games ⋮ Optimal control of heterogeneous mutating viruses ⋮ Towards a theory of game-based non-equilibrium control systems ⋮ Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable? ⋮ Pure infection-immunization dynamics for partnership games: a correction ⋮ Dominant-set clustering: a review ⋮ On exploring the genetic algorithm for modeling the evolution of cooperation in a population ⋮ The Complexity of Simple Models—A Study of Worst and Typical Hard Cases for the Standard Quadratic Optimization Problem ⋮ Two-stage stochastic standard quadratic optimization

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