Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure
From MaRDI portal
Publication:649129
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5zbMath1235.91058MaRDI QIDQ649129
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5
Related Items
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics, Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union, Probabilistic spatial power indexes
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