Common belief and common knowledge

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-NzbMath0794.90010OpenAlexW2166172407MaRDI QIDQ690342

Shmuel Zamir, Spyros Vassilakis

Publication date: 31 August 1994

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-n

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgehierarchies of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (7)

A model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selection ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets ⋮ Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself? ⋮ Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information

Cites Work

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• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Common knowledge with probability 1
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

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