Evidence disclosure and verifiability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:705843
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.002zbMath1093.91031MaRDI QIDQ705843
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6th0060j
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
Related Items
Persuasion and dynamic communication, Implementation with evidence, Implementation with partial provability, Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships, Hard evidence and mechanism design, Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion, Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide, Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production, Implementation via rights structures, The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation, Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons, Mechanism design with partial state verifiability, COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING, Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
Cites Work
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
- Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
- Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes
