Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
From MaRDI portal
Publication:776253
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_11zbMath1435.91059arXiv1909.10584MaRDI QIDQ776253
Alexandros Psomas, Rad Niazadeh, Shaddin Dughmi, S. Matthew Weinberg
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.10584
91B03: Mechanism design theory
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Optimal Auction Design
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
- Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion.
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
- A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
- Constrained Signaling in Auction Design