Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90017-EzbMath0727.90007MaRDI QIDQ804453

Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer, Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimal Bayesian incentive compatible; Pareto optimal strongly incentive compatible; Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms; truthful revelation of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

An experimental study of storable votes, Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus, Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance, Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview, Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort, The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game., Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey., Balanced Bayesian mechanisms, Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance, Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept