Price discrimination and efficient matching
From MaRDI portal
Publication:868606
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0058-2zbMath1109.91393OpenAlexW2006131948MaRDI QIDQ868606
Publication date: 6 March 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0058-2
Related Items
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers ⋮ Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform ⋮ Tailored recommendations on a matching platform ⋮ Informational hold up and intermediaries ⋮ Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress ⋮ Dress to impress: brands as status symbols ⋮ Matching through position auctions ⋮ Matching with peer monitoring ⋮ Coarse matching with incomplete information ⋮ Entry-deterring agency ⋮ Synchronized matching with incomplete information ⋮ Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information ⋮ Monopolistic Signal Provision
Cites Work
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Monopoly and product quality
- Screening in a Matching Market
- Monopolistic Signal Provision
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal Auction Design
- Marriage and Class
- Coarse Matching