Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.010zbMath1330.91019OpenAlexW3125154421MaRDI QIDQ894008

Qing-Min Liu

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

correlationcorrelated equilibriumcommon priorredundant typesinterim rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (6)

Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ Private disclosure with multiple agents ⋮ Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Informational robustness of common belief in rationality ⋮ Interim partially correlated rationalizability

Cites Work

• Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
• Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
• On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
• Intrinsic correlation in games
• From posteriors to priors via cycles
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Comparison of information structures
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

This page was built for publication: Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information