Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0251-6zbMath1203.91022MaRDI QIDQ926225

Bertrand Tchantcho, Roland Pongou, Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Publication date: 26 May 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0251-6

zbMATH Keywords

stability; cooperation; Pareto-optimality; collective choice; binding solidarity agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B12: Voting theory

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation, A core of voting games with improved foresight, A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games, Properties of ladder tournaments, On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval, A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority, Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power, SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

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