A stability index for local effectivity functions
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Publication:975939
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.12.003zbMath1230.91020OpenAlexW2154326605MaRDI QIDQ975939
Publication date: 11 June 2010
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.12.003
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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- Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
- Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms
- Rectangularity and Tightness: A Normal Form Characterization of Perfect Information Extensive Game Forms
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