On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2010.01.038zbMath1188.91084MaRDI QIDQ976430

B. E. Eshmatov

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.01.038

zbMATH Keywords

simulation; allocative efficiency; computational experiment; combinatorial auction; primal-dual auction; subgradient auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, A decision support framework for evaluating revenue performance in sequential purchase contexts, Recent advances in robust optimization: an overview, A trading mechanism contingent on several indices

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