The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0280-XzbMath1163.91343OpenAlexW2054890293MaRDI QIDQ1024771

Serguei Kaniovski

Publication date: 17 June 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0280-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (10)

Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting ⋮ Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury ⋮ How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules ⋮ A Test of the Marginalist Defense of the Rational Voter Hypothesis Using Quantile Regression ⋮ Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem ⋮ Voting power: an information theory approach ⋮ Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies ⋮ An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes ⋮ Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation

Cites Work

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• Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
• A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition
• The mathematics and statistics of voting power
• Fair Apportionment and the Banzhaf Index
• Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation
• Multilinear Extensions of Games

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