Solution concepts of \(k\)-convex \(n\)-person games
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Publication:1096552
DOI10.1007/BF01769385zbMath0633.90097OpenAlexW2496445699MaRDI QIDQ1096552
Publication date: 1986
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769385
Shapley valuecorekernelnucleolusbargaining set\(\tau\)-valuegeometrical propertiesprekernel\(k\)-convex game
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Cites Work
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