A value with incomplete communication

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0641zbMath0915.90281OpenAlexW2098937137MaRDI QIDQ1279616

Gérard Hamiache

Publication date: 16 February 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0641

zbMATH Keywords

consistencynonnegative matrixShapley valuevaluePerron-Frobenius theoremMyerson valuelimited communicationassociated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (27)

A core-allocation for a network restricted linear production game ⋮ The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense ⋮ Associated consistency, value and graphs ⋮ The Myerson value for complete coalition structures ⋮ The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games ⋮ A probabilistic position value ⋮ Graph monotonic values ⋮ Union negotiations: complement-associated games ⋮ Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems ⋮ ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COMPUTING VALUES OF RESTRICTED GAMES ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations ⋮ Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games ⋮ Bargaining power in communication networks ⋮ The core and the Weber set of games on augmenting systems ⋮ Cooperative games with partial information ⋮ Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation ⋮ On the Position Value for Special Classes of Networks ⋮ Networks and outside options ⋮ An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes ⋮ Marginality and Myerson values ⋮ Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies ⋮ The center value: a sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs ⋮ Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for games on augmenting systems ⋮ Cooperative Game as Non-Additive Measure ⋮ Conference structures and consistency ⋮ A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures ⋮ A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

Cites Work

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• Communication and its cost in graph-restricted games
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Coalition formation under limited communication
• Games and cooperation indices
• The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
• Link formation in cooperative situations.
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• On the Position Value for Communication Situations
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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