Starting small and renegotiation

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2487zbMath0919.90147MaRDI QIDQ1289252

Joel Watson

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2487

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided incomplete information; long-term partnership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

Related Items

OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS, Signaling in social network and social capital formation, Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem, Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma, Starting small and commitment, Cooperation, punishment and immigration, Long-term relationships as safeguards, Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games, Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth, Bargaining power in repeated games, A model of gradual information disclosure, Stag hunt with unknown outside options, Starting small to communicate, Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game, Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors, Even up: maintaining relationships, Building rational cooperation, Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism, Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types

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