On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0656zbMath0918.90143OpenAlexW2138858400MaRDI QIDQ1288246

Sang-Seung Yi

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0656

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium setPareto efficient frontier

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (10)

Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information ⋮ Secure implementation in allotment economies ⋮ Coalition-proofness and dominance relations ⋮ Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly. ⋮ Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance ⋮ COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES ⋮ Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads ⋮ Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Market Structure and Innovation
• Finding All n-Firm Cournot Equilibria
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

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