Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
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Publication:1293484
DOI10.1007/s001820050101zbMath0937.91028OpenAlexW2009872003MaRDI QIDQ1293484
Publication date: 14 June 2000
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050101
Applications of game theory (91A80) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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