Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00043-7zbMath0929.91018MaRDI QIDQ1296476

Anna Bogomolnaia, Salvador Barberá, Hans van der Stel

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

smoothness; lotteries; social choice rules; continuous strategy-proof probabilistic rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences, Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted, Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes, Fully sincere voting, Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges, Strategy-proof social choice correspondences., Collective choice under dichotomous preferences

Cites Work

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• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes