Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
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Publication:1364784
DOI10.1016/S0166-218X(96)00100-XzbMath0879.90060OpenAlexW2019142746WikidataQ127565005 ScholiaQ127565005MaRDI QIDQ1364784
Publication date: 28 August 1997
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/dam
Related Items (8)
A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure ⋮ Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods ⋮ The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity ⋮ Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ A characterization of proportionally representative committees ⋮ A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Strategic voting and nomination
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