Arrow's theorem and Turing computability

DOI10.1007/S001990050157zbMATH Open0882.90003OpenAlexW2138509834WikidataQ55899880 ScholiaQ55899880MaRDI QIDQ1365367FDOQ1365367

H. Reiju Mihara

Publication date: 10 March 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55723

zbMATH Keywords

independencesocial welfare functionunanimitydenumerable societypairwise computability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (19)

• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Infinite populations, choice and determinacy
• Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
• On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions
• The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
• Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
• Superset-robust collective choice rules
• Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society
• The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience)
• Intergenerational equity and infinite-population ethics: a survey
• On the computability of quasi-transitive binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem
• Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
• Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
• Quasi-stationary social welfare functions
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Anonymity in large societies
• Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
• On the computability of binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem

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