Strategy-proof allotment rules
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Publication:1367676
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0511zbMath0888.90005MaRDI QIDQ1367676
Matthew O. Jackson, Alejandro Neme, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 21 May 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1142.pdf
91B14: Social choice
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