Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0528zbMath0889.90166OpenAlexW2068227353MaRDI QIDQ1367682

Klaus Kultti, Hannu Salonen

Publication date: 4 June 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0528

zbMATH Keywords

games with strategic complementaritiesundominated pure strategy Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games ⋮ Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Weak and strong monotone comparative statics
• On the existence of undominated Nash equilibria in normal form games
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria