Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences.
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Publication:1408714
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00049-6zbMath1056.91012OpenAlexW2123537229MaRDI QIDQ1408714
Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00049-6
Related Items (4)
Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata ⋮ DYADIC THEORETICAL GAMES MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING FOR THE LEXICOGRAPHIC VECTOR PAYOFFS ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
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- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
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