Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not?

DOI10.3390/g9020029zbMath1404.91083OpenAlexW2803826101WikidataQ129805211 ScholiaQ129805211MaRDI QIDQ1651910

Alexander Mayer

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020029

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamesweighted votingvoting powernull playerdummy player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games ⋮ Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions ⋮ Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining ⋮ Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis ⋮ Brexit and power in the Council of the European Union

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