Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
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Publication:1668490
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.007zbMath1396.91322OpenAlexW2342592084MaRDI QIDQ1668490
Publication date: 29 August 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.007
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