The winner's curse: conditional reasoning and belief formation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.12.002zbMath1400.91224OpenAlexW3126119766MaRDI QIDQ1701026

Christian Koch, Stefan P. Penczynski

Publication date: 22 February 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/65779/1/Accepted_manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsauctionswinner's curseconditional reasoning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: an experimental investigation ⋮ An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• A Comment on “Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study”
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

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