Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
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Publication:1731822
DOI10.1007/s13675-018-0106-xzbMath1409.90108OpenAlexW2895817455MaRDI QIDQ1731822
Mustafa Çelebi Pinar, Kamyar Kargar, Halil Ibrahim Bayrak
Publication date: 14 March 2019
Published in: EURO Journal on Computational Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/49823
Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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