Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

DOI10.1007/s001820400177zbMath1098.91080OpenAlexW2099084709MaRDI QIDQ1767476

Bettina Klaus, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 11 March 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400177

zbMATH Keywords

Indivisible objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly, Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics, House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence, Consistent house allocation, Local and global consistency properties for student placement, Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities, Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets, A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects, The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach, Fair and efficient student placement with couples, Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents, Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange, Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems, Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems, On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems, Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects, Efficient priority rules, On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms