Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0082zbMath0863.90139OpenAlexW2054943622MaRDI QIDQ1815202

Pierpaolo Battigalli

Publication date: 7 November 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0082

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionindependence property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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