An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00002-7zbMath1033.91018MaRDI QIDQ1864813

Thomas Tröger, Ana B. Ania, Achim Wambach

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bounded rationalityStochastic stabilityImitationAdverse selectionInsurance marketsLocal experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (7)

Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection ⋮ THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES

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