Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
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Publication:1864818
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00008-8zbMath1092.91506MaRDI QIDQ1864818
Publication date: 23 March 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (3)
Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games ⋮ Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
Cites Work
- Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Commitment and observability in games
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
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