Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2941zbMath1035.91006MaRDI QIDQ1867529

Joergen W. Weibull, Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/1c779ce9-9daa-4893-9ddb-e393d5800797

zbMATH Keywords

evolution; mutation rates; mistakes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations, Coalitional stochastic stability, Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play, Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities, Entropic penalties in finite games, Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games, Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium, The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes, Robust stochastic stability, The logit-response dynamics, Stochastic stability on general state spaces, Rapid evolution under inertia

Cites Work

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