Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
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Publication:1867529
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2941zbMath1035.91006MaRDI QIDQ1867529
Joergen W. Weibull, Eric E. C. van Damme
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/1c779ce9-9daa-4893-9ddb-e393d5800797
91A10: Noncooperative games
91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution
91A22: Evolutionary games
Related Items
Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations, Coalitional stochastic stability, Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play, Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities, Entropic penalties in finite games, Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games, Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium, The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes, Robust stochastic stability, The logit-response dynamics, Stochastic stability on general state spaces, Rapid evolution under inertia
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