Bribing and signaling in second price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.005zbMath1068.91022OpenAlexW2125102323MaRDI QIDQ1885436

Péter Eső, James Schummer

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

CollusionSignalingBribingSecond-price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices ⋮ Speculation in procurement auctions ⋮ On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Bribing in first-price auctions ⋮ Bribe-proof rules in the division problem ⋮ Bribing in team contests ⋮ Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions ⋮ Bidding collusion without passive updating ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Optimal collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Manipulation through bribes
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players