Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0129-3zbMath1260.91103OpenAlexW1969191720MaRDI QIDQ1944865

Christer Andersson, Tommy Andersson, Ola Andersson

Publication date: 28 March 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0129-3

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionsexperimentsnon-manipulability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• School choice: an experimental study
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

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