Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant

DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9356-6zbMath1204.68146OpenAlexW2067288168MaRDI QIDQ1959729

Chien-Chung Huang

Publication date: 7 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9356-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10)

Related Items (10)

Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem ⋮ \(d\)-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? ⋮ Maximising expectation of the number of transplants in kidney exchange programmes ⋮ Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem ⋮ Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences ⋮ Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences ⋮ Stable marriage with general preferences ⋮ On the existence of three-dimensional stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
• Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
• The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
• Kidney Exchange
• Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
• Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Stable Family and Threesome Roommates Problems
• The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
• A New Approach to Stable Matching Problems
• Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant