Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2020.07.019zbMath1459.91067arXiv2007.14274OpenAlexW3044780425MaRDI QIDQ2006772

Alexandros A. Voudouris

Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.14274

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionsbudget constraintsliquid price of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions

Cites Work

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