A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-64563-5_1zbMath1503.91057OpenAlexW4205962346MaRDI QIDQ2151318

Rachel Perez Palha, Hannu Nurmi

Publication date: 1 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64563-5_1

zbMATH Keywords

no-show paradoxvoting proceduresprofile restrictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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