Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
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Publication:2155910
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.006zbMath1497.91136OpenAlexW3089795042MaRDI QIDQ2155910
Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim
Publication date: 15 July 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73439/7/D%C3%BCtting_Best-response%20dynamics%20in%20combinatorial%20auctions%20with%20item%20bidding_published_2017%20LSERO1.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Game theory and fuzziness (91A86)
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