Finite populations choose an optimal language
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Publication:2216359
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.08.009zbMath1454.91163OpenAlexW2138874443WikidataQ81373504 ScholiaQ81373504MaRDI QIDQ2216359
Publication date: 15 December 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.08.009
Related Items (4)
Dynamics in atomic signaling games ⋮ Non trivial coexistence conditions for a model of language competition obtained by bifurcation theory ⋮ One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations ⋮ Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games
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- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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