Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.008zbMath1250.91050MaRDI QIDQ2276557

Dan Levin, Kirill Chernomaz

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economics; asymmetric auctions; first-price auctions; free-riding; combinatorial auctions; package bidding; independent private value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction, An asymmetric multi-item auction with quantity discounts applied to Internet service procurement in Buenos Aires public schools, Games played through agents in the laboratory -- a test of Prat \& Rustichini's model, Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
• The package assignment model.
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Core-selecting package auctions
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on an Auction’s Performance: Are More Bidders Always Better?
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Combinatorial auction design
• A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies