Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0847-2zbMath1318.91067OpenAlexW2144068926MaRDI QIDQ2341124

François Maniquet, Philippe Mongin

Publication date: 23 April 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

Philippe Mongin 1950--2020 ⋮ Majority-approval social choice ⋮ The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures ⋮ The informational basis of scoring rules ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ Philippe Mongin (1950-2020) ⋮ Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
• A simple characterization of approval voting
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
• Twitching weak dictators
• Characterizing approval voting
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Weak independence and veto power.
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Axiomatizations of Approval Voting
• The Basic Approval Voting Game
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem