On membership and marginal values

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0367-9zbMath1269.91009OpenAlexW2053056619MaRDI QIDQ2376072

Jeffrey H. Weiss, Norman L. Kleinberg

Publication date: 26 June 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0367-9

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessShapley valueBanzhaf valueegalitarian valueequal allocation of non-separable costsmembership value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

A note on associated consistency and linear, symmetric values ⋮ Representation theory of the symmetric group in voting theory and game theory

Cites Work

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• The Orthogonal Decomposition of Games and an Averaging Formula for the Shapley Value
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

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