Even up: maintaining relationships

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.002zbMath1400.91055OpenAlexW2588635397MaRDI QIDQ2397634

Ennio Stacchetti, Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

transfersrepeated gamesincentivesrelationshipscontinuation valuesfavors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Monotone contracts ⋮ Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital

Uses Software

• repgames

Cites Work

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• Rules with Discretion and Local Information*
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation1
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

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