Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.002zbMath1417.91243OpenAlexW2925212247MaRDI QIDQ2425156

Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 26 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibilitymulti-dimensional mechanism designdominant strategy incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach

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