Belief consistency and trade consistency

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.005zbMath1288.91166OpenAlexW1965858144MaRDI QIDQ2437174

Dov Samet, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

type spacesagreeing to disagreecommon priorDutch booksno-trade theoremsbelief consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Trade models (91B60) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items

Monologues, dialogues, and common priors, Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium, Agreeing to agree and Dutch books, Countable spaces and common priors, Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
• On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
• Common Priors: A Reply to Gul
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model